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C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 010691 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2016 
TAGS: KJUS PGOV PINR PREL PTER CO
SUBJECT: CARAMAGNA SAYS PEACE PROCESS RESPONSIBLE FOR 
AIRING POLITICAL-PARAMILITARY TIES 
 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor John S. Creamer 
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
 
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Summary 
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¶1.  (C) Sergio Caramagna, Director of the Mission to Support 
the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OAS), told us on November 
20 that the peace process with the paramilitaries has helped 
expose the ties between the paramilitaries and politicians. 
Caramagna was pleased by a recent meeting held with top GOC 
civilian and military officials on the need to combat new, 
emerging criminal groups.  Defense Minister Santos suggested 
a monthly meeting to exchange information. Caramagna also 
said the MAPP/OAS has unofficial GOC approval to extend its 
mandate for three years.  End summary. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Caramagna's Reaction to Recent Scandals 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) MAPP/OAS Director Sergio Caramagna told us on 
November 20 that politician-paramilitary ties would not have 
become a public issue if not for the peace process with the 
paramilitaries.  He was encouraged by the public exposure of 
such links and hoped the truth would continue to emerge.  He 
said Colombia's judicial system needed more resources to 
implement the Justice and Peace law, but stressed that 
Colombia was the only country in the world with a plan to 
compensate victims and to punish the main perpetrators of 
crimes against humanity. 
 
¶3.  (C) Caramagna said when he visited La Ceja two weeks ago, 
former paramilitary leaders told him they had not been able 
to control their former mid-level commanders for some time. 
He noted the former paramilitary leaders were alone and 
resentful.  Even though they are better off in La Ceja than 
they would be in other prison facilities, what was important 
was that "they feel imprisoned." 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
MAPP/OAS and GOC Establish Information Exchange 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶4.  (C) Caramagna was pleased with a November 10 meeting 
convoked by Vice President Francisco Santos to exchange 
MAPP/OAS and GOC information on rearmament and emerging 
criminal groups.  Caramagna said the purpose was to offer the 
GOC an opportunity to respond to the  MAPP/OAS's VIII 
Quarterly Report, which focused on the emergence of new 
criminal groups.  GOC officials in attendance included Vice 
President Santos, Minister of Defense Juan Manuel Santos, 
Prosecutor General Mario Iguaran, Peace Commissioner 
Restrepo, the chiefs of the branches of the Armed Services, 
National Police Director General Jorge Castro, DIJIN Director 
General Oscar Naranjo, and Carabineros Director Jorge Gomez. 
 
¶5.  (C) Caramagna said the MAPP/OAS presented its report to 
the GOC on 22 criminal structures associated with former 
demobilized paramilitaries (please see paragraphs 12 and 13 
for information on the groups).  Caramagna noted the 22 
criminal structures have survived military and police 
operations to dismantle them.  He gave special attention to 
former mid-level paramilitaries from the North Bloc, whose 
organizations remain largely intact and are especially strong 
in Cesar and southern Magdalena.  MAPP/OAS also warned of 
cooperation in certain regions between these criminal groups 
and elements of the security forces. 
 
¶6.  (C) Defense Minister Santos said the GOC should meet 
monthly with the MAPP/OEA to evaluate the situation.  Santos 
said the GOC should receive the MAPP/OAS quarterly reports 
with gratitude rather than resistance, and use them 
constructively.  Permanent coordination and confidence 
building should include constructive criticism.  He said he 
 
"perceived government willingness to combat these gangs but 
it has not been enough." The Colombian Army Intelligence 
motto should not say "God rewards persistence," but rather 
"God rewards persistence and efficiency."  He also suggested 
the information reward system be expanded, not only to cover 
leaders such as Vicente Castano and "Los Mellizos," but also 
to include former mid-level paramilitary leaders.  Lastly, he 
recommended that the Administrative Department of Security 
(DAS) and the Reinsertion Commissioner's Office attend these 
meetings. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Actions Against Emerging Criminal Gangs 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) In the November 10 meeting, National Police Director 
General Castro emphasized the increased police presence in 
demobilized areas and the number of operations against 
emerging criminal groups.  In 2006, the police inaugurated 54 
stations in 18 departments to establish GOC control over 
areas formerly controlled by the ex-paras.  Moreover, the 
police established 12 additional stations in areas associated 
with new criminal groups.  The police have 2,733 new officers 
dedicated exclusively to securing  areas formerly controlled 
by the ex-paras.  Castro hoped to add 38 additional stations 
by the end of 2006, with 50 more planned for 2007.  He said 
that in October, the police conducted 15 operations against 
these groups and captured 90 people. 
 
¶8.  (C) Military Commander General Mario Montoya stressed 
that the last paramilitary group demobilized in August which 
means the AUC no longer exists.  He characterized the task 
facing security forces as combating "criminal gangs or 
delinquents at the service of narcotraffickers."  Montoya 
emphasized the need for the military to occupy strategic 
areas previously occupied by the paramilitaries.  He said 
mobile brigades have been sent to key areas and joint task 
forces have been created in the departments of Choco, 
Cordoba, Meta, Cauca, Narino, Antioquia Risaralda, and areas 
between Valle and Choco. 
 
¶9.  (C) Peace Commissioner Restrepo agreed with the MAPP/OAS 
assertion that emerging criminal gangs have been hit.  But he 
noted they had not been eliminated because "they are anchored 
to the region's illicit economy and their social control over 
the population persists."  Restrepo said the police needed 
more resources to fight the groups.  He stressed that 
corruption within security forces needed to be addressed. 
Examples should be made of corrupt officials to show that the 
government was serious. 
 
----------------------------------- 
MAPP/OAS Plan of Action for 2007-10 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) Caramagna said the GOC has unofficially approved an 
extension of the MAPP/OAS mandate for an additional three 
years.  He talked to Minister of Foreign Affairs Maria 
Consuelo Araujo and Peace Commissioner Restrepo, and both 
agreed with extending the Mission's mandate beyond its 
current January 2007 deadline.  The MAPP/OAS is also working 
on a new action plan which it plans to present to the Group 
of Friends on November 28. 
 
¶11.  (C) The new action plan includes two strategies: 
consolidate the work with the AUC, and expand support for any 
similar process with the ELN or FARC.  The first strategy 
includes post-demobilization and reinsertion verification; 
Justice and Peace Law monitoring; support for the Reparations 
and Reconciliation Commission; and support for local and 
civil society initiatives.  The second strategy consists of 
improving MAPP/OAS's analytical capacity on the armed 
conflict and scenarios for a political negotiation; 
confidence building efforts; geographical presence in key 
territories; and technical support for any future peace 
processes.  Caramagna said the only international group 
prepared to assist in a future peace process with the ELN or 
 
the FARC was the OAS.  He said both the European Union and 
the United Nations would face political and technical 
difficulties in playing such a role. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
Information on the 22 Emerging Criminal Groups 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶12.  (C) The MAPP/OAS identified 22 cases of rearmament of 
former demobilized paramilitaries.  It had verified the 
existence of fourteen groups in ten departments and was 
examining reports regarding eight more groups.  It estimated 
there were a total of 3,000 criminal group members, among 
them common criminals, narcotraffickers, paramilitaries who 
never demobilized, and former demobilized paramilitaries. 
The percentage of the former demobilized paramilitaries 
participating was still small, but this could change.  The 
following are the 14 cases of rearmament: 
 
- Guajira Department: three groups called "Aguilas Negras," 
"Aguilas de la Sierra," and "AUC," composed of 160 members, 
led by former mid-level paramilitary leaders.  The modus 
operandi was control of illicit economy -- narcotrafficking 
and hydrocarbons contraband. 
 
- Atlantico Department: a 60-member group led by former 
mid-level paramilitary leaders; they continue to call 
themselves AUC.  The modus operandi is control of illicit and 
licit economy -- education and healthcare sectors. 
 
- Cesar Department: three groups composed of 400 members led 
by former mid-level paramilitary leaders; one group's name is 
"Aguilas Negras."  The modus operandi is control of illicit 
and licit economy -- public works projects. 
 
- North Santander Department: a 300-400 member group led by 
former mid-level paramilitary leaders; they continue to call 
themselves "Aguilas Negras."  The modus operandi is control 
of illicit economy -- narcotrafficking, arms trafficking, and 
hydrocarbons contraband. 
 
- Bolivar Department: a 50-member group led by former 
mid-level paramilitary leaders; their group name is unknown. 
The modus operandi is control of coca production, kidnapping, 
and selective killings. 
 
- Cordoba Department: a 50-member group led by a former 
mid-level paramilitary leader; the group name is "Los 
Traquetos."  The modus operandi is control of coca production 
and control over the population. 
 
- Tolima Department: a 20-member group; the group name is 
"Bloque Pijao."  The leader is undetermined.  The modus 
operandi is extortion and kidnapping. 
 
- Casanare Department: a 200-member group led by a former 
mid-level paramilitary leader; the group name is 
undetermined.  The modus operandi is extortion.  Military 
operations, however, have forced its displacement. 
 
- Caqueta Department: a 50-member group led by a former 
mid-level paramilitary leader; the group name is not 
determined.  The modus operandi is extortion and control over 
the population.  Military operations on October 21 led to the 
death of two members, one of which was the principal 
commander. 
 
- Narino Department: a 250-300-member group led by a former 
mid-level paramilitary leader; the group name is "Nueva 
Generacion Colombia" or "Mano Negra."  The modus operandi is 
control of extortion and control over the population.  In 
September and October the FARC's 29th Front confronted the 
group.  These combats led to the displacement of residents in 
several administrative units or "corregimientos." 
 
¶13.  The following are eight groups still being identified: 
 
- Cesar Department: a 70-member group led by former mid-level 
paramilitary leaders; the group name is not determined.  The 
modus operandi is extortion and control over the population. 
 
- Magdalena Department: a 150-member group led by former 
mid-level paramilitary leaders; the group name is "Mano Negra 
and/or Power Rangers."  The modus operandi is extortion and 
control over the population. 
 
- Sucre Department: a 20-member group led by a former 
mid-level paramilitary leader; the group name is "Cartel 
Verde" or "Aguilas Negras."  The modus operandi is economic 
and political control over the population. 
 
- Antioquia Department: a 60-member group led by former 
mid-level paramilitary leaders; the group name is not 
determined.  The modus operandi is control over the 
population and the illicit economy. 
 
- Santander Department: a 25-member group led by a former 
mid-level paramilitary leaders; the group name is not 
determined.  The modus operandi is extortion and illicit 
economy. 
 
- Meta Department: a 200-member group led by a former 
mid-level paramilitary leader; the group name is not 
determined.  The modus operandi illicit crops and 
narcotrafficking. 
 
- Narino Department: a 100-member group; group's leader has 
not been determined; the group has several names "Nueva 
Generacion Colombia," "Mano Negra," "Los Traquetos, and "Los 
Rastrojos."  The modus operandi is narcotrafficking. 
 
- Putumayo Department: a 350-member group; the group's leader 
has not been determined; the group has several names 
"Rastrojos," "Cruzados," or "a faction of Sur Putumayo Front 
that never demobilized."  The modus operandi is 
narcotrafficking. 
WOOD 

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